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I. INTRODUCTION
A rich and varied literature has grown up around food aid,' in
particular with regard to its use as a development tool, in response to
slow-onset disasters (such as droughts and desertification), and in
armed conflicts. Given that these applications make up the bulk of
the millions of tons of food aid recorded annually and present some of
the thorniest operational issues, perhaps it is not surprising that the
regulation of food aid provided in sudden-impact disasters (such as
earthquakes, tsunamis, wind storms, and floods) has not been as
thoroughly examined.
Still, while the amount of food involved is comparatively small,
the lives and dignity of millions of people depend on speedy, effective,
and appropriate food assistance in sudden-impact disasters as well.
In practice, regulatory problems pose significant obstacles to meeting
this need. While there are some relevant international instruments
and norms, they have had less impact than might be hoped in
addressing the most common operating issues. Moreover, existing
international standards on food aid fail to address the particular
dynamics of sudden-impact disasters, do not go far enough to link
food assistance to other sectors of disaster relief, and ignore the
growing role of the non-governmental and private sectors in disaster
relief. Since reform is currently in the air in global food aid, 2 this is
also the time to address these related issues.
Part II of this Article will provide some background on food aid
in sudden-impact disasters as a subset of global food aid and signal
some trends in the composition of the aid-providing community. Part
III will look to some examples of common legal problems in providing
food aid, including not only regulation of the food itself but also

1.
See Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N. [FAO], FAO Legislative Study No. 87
Perspectives and Guidelines on Food Legislation, with a New Model Food Law 87, 130
(2005), available at http://www.fao.org/legal/legstudls87/ls87e.pdf (prepared by Jessica
Vapnek & Melvin Spreij) ("What constitutes 'food aid' is a matter of considerable
controversy. Some authors define it as 'the international sourcing of concessional
resources in the form of or for the provision of food', while others include national
domestically funded distribution of food in the definition."). This paper will operate
under the definition advocated by FAO: "Food aid is the international sourcing of
concessional resources in the form of or for the provision of food." FAO, The State of
Food and Agriculture 2006: Food Aid for Food Security?, at 11 (2006) [hereinafter Food
Aid for Food Security]. This definition includes both in-kind provision of food as well as
cash assistance provided for the purchase of food. However, it does not include just any
programme with potential effects on food security or domestic assistance efforts. Id.
2.
See, e.g., Press Release, FAO, FAO Urges Food Aid Reform, (Jan. 24, 2007),
available at http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2007/1000482/index.html
(noting
that there is a proposal for "a series of major changes in the way international food aid
is managed and delivered").

2007]

FAST FOOD

indirect barriers to importing and distributing the right food at the
right time. Part IV will examine existing international law in light of
these common problems. Part V will offer some thoughts on one way
forward on these issues.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Food Aid for Sudden-Impact Disastersin Context
In light of the limitations of major data sources for global food
aid, it is difficult to draw a clear statistical picture of the food
provided in response to sudden-impact disasters in particular.
However, it is reasonable to conclude that the amount provided is
modest compared to other types of food aid, including emergency aid
for armed conflict situations and droughts.
According to the World Food Programme's (WFP) International
Food Aid Information System (INTERFAIS), the proportion of global
food aid devoted to emergencies, as opposed to economic support and
development, 3 increased from thirty-four percent in 1996 to sixty-four
percent in 2005, and rose in absolute terms from 2.7 million tons in
However, this "emergency"
1996 to 5.2 million tons in 2005. 4
category includes all types of natural and man-made disasters. Of
the top nine recipients of emergency food aid in 2005 reported by
INTERFAIS, five had experienced a sudden-onset disaster, but
together the nine recipients represented only eleven percent of overall
5
emergency aid.
Similarly, according to the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), of
the $15.7 billion donated for food-sector assistance in humanitarian
relief operations from 1999 to 2007, $3.8 billion, or twenty-four
percent, were for natural disasters (of both slow- and sudden-onset
varieties). 6 Thus, the large majority of donations were devoted to

INTERFAIS tracks food aid in three categories: "programme, project,"
3.
and "emergency." See WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME INTERFAIS, FOOD AID MONITOR2006 FOOD AID FLOWs, at vi (2006) [hereinafter Food Aid Monitor]. "Programme" food
aid refers to food provided on grant or loan to a government for its economic support.
Id. "Project" food aid refers to food provided as part of poverty-reduction or disaster
prevention activities aimed a specific beneficiaries. Id. "Emergency" food aid is food
provided for free to the victims of natural or man-made disasters. Id.
4.
See id. at Tbl. 9; see also Development Assistance Comm., Org. for Econ.
Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Table 18: Major Aid Uses by Individual DAC Donors,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/11/1893159.xls (last viewed May 21, 2007) (noting
that humanitarian aid from the major donor countries rose from 1.9 percent of all DAC
aid in 1984-85 to 10 percent in 2004-2005).
5.
See Food Aid Monitor, supranote 3, at 19.
6.
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA],
Financial Tracking Service[FTS], Trends Analysis-Evolution Of Funding By Sector
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situations of armed conflict, which are considered to be "the most
severe emergencies in terms of widespread food insecurity, starvation
and excess mortality. 7
On the other hand, available country-level statistics on suddenimpact disaster relief operations show that food aid can play a
substantial role in those operations.
For instance, the United
Nations' Flash Appeals for the 2007 floods in Bolivia and
Mozambique both devoted more than forty percent of the total
amount requested to food assistance.8
Moreover, the absolute
numbers of persons requiring food in these types of disasters can
sometimes be impressive. For example, after the 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami, WFP provided food to over 2.2 million persons across six
countries. 9 After the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, 2.3
million persons required food assistance in that one country alone. 10
Thus, while normally eclipsed by the size and complexity of food
operations in slow-onset disasters and armed conflicts, sudden-impact
disasters can also sometimes reach an epic scale.
B. Food Aid Requirements in Sudden-Impact Disasters
Still, whereas major slow-onset disasters frequently create food
needs, slow-onset disasters only do so sometimes.'1
Floods,
windstorms, tsunamis and tidal waves are the most common of the
sudden-impact disasters to create food needs, 12 in large part by
destroying harvests, foods stocks, animals and seeds.' 3 Volcanic

Over The Last 9 Years, 1999-2007, http://ocha.unog.ch/fts2/by-sector.asp (last viewed
Sept. 3, 2007).
7.
See SUSAN JASPERS & HELEN YOUNG, GENERAL FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN
EMERGENCIES: FROM NUTRITIONAL NEEDS TO POLITICAL PRIORITIES 8 (Relief and
Rehabilitation Network 1995).
8.
OCHA, FTS, Flash Appeal: Bolivia Flash Appeal 2007, Table D:
Requirements, Commitments/Contributions and Pledges per Sector as of 3-Sept-2007,
available at
http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/reports/daily/ochaR3sum A759_07090307.pdf
(requesting $4.9 million for food out of a total appeal for $12.1 million); OCHA, FTS,
Flash Appeal: Mozambique Floods and Cyclone Flash Appeal 2007, Table D.
Requirements, Commitments/Contributionsand Pledges per Sector, as of 22-May-2007,
available at
http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/reports/daily/ocha-R3sumA760_07090307.pdf
(requesting $16.1 million for food out of a total appeal for $37.6 million).
9.
Press Release, World Food Programme, Tsunami One Year On: WFP
Extends Food Aid For Indonesia and Sri Lanka (Nov. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.wfp.org/english/?ModuleID=137&Key=1940.
10.
OCHA, Pakistan Earthquake: OCHA Situation Report No. 24 (Nov. 20,
2005),
available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db90Osid/KHII-6JC2PK?
OpenDocument.
11.
See PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORG., HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN DISASTER
SITUATIONS: A GUIDE FOR EFFECTIVE AID 16-17 (1999).
12.
See id. Note that flooding is not always rapid, and this type of disaster can
thus straddle the divide between sudden- and slow-onset.
13.
INT'L FED'N OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, DISASTER
EMERGENCY NEEDS ASSESSMENT 24 (2000). This is significant in light of the fact that
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eruptions can also result in food needs due to widespread destruction
of crops. 14 Earthquakes occasionally cause significant food shortages,
as they did in Pakistan in 2005 and Bam, Iran in 2003.15 This is
particularly true when the earthquake destroys food distribution
17
systems and markets. 16 However, this is not commonly the case.
For example, notwithstanding the significant devastation of the 2001
earthquake in Gujarat, India, food supplies were not greatly
disrupted.1 8
In general, food needs that do result from sudden-impact
disasters are urgent but temporary, whereas in slow-impact
disasters-such as droughts or locust infestations-food needs
develop gradually and tend to be longer-lasting. 19 In the first critical
hours and days after a sudden-impact emergency, "[tjhere will be
insufficient time for extensive or detailed assessment and the organization of
large-scale external support."'20 Consequently, "[t]o give any useful benefit,
external help must involve delivery of very specific packages of aid to reinforce
existing [local] activity. ' 21 Moreover, different types of food aid-in
particular, prepared rather than dry foods-may make more sense in
the immediate aftermath of sudden-impact disasters than in the
22
slow-onset context.

floods and storms have evolved over the last thirty years to become the most frequent
types of disaster, and current predictions are that global warming will lead to increases
in these and other hydrological disasters in the coming years.
See
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in
WORKING GROUP II CONTRIBUTION TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT 14-15 (2007),

available at http://www.ipcc-wg2.org/index.html.
14.
See PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORG., NATURAL DISASTERS: PROTECTING THE
PUBLIC'S HEALTH 59 (2000) (hereinafter PROTECTING THE PUBLIC).
15.
See Rahul Bedi, Pakistan Winds Down Rescue to Focus on Recovering the
Dead, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 15, 2005, at 10, available at http://www.ireland.com
newspaperlworldI2005/1015/1127148500909.html; OCHA, Workshop of Lessons Learnt
on the National and InternationalResponse to the Barn Earthquake, Kerman, Iran,
Apr. 14-15, 2004, Report, 14 (prepared by Piero Calvi-Parisetti) [hereinafter Bam
Workshop Report].
16.
Ellen Messer & Laurie de Rose, Food Shortage, in WHO'S HUNGRY? AND
HOW DO WE KNOW?: FOOD SHORTAGE, POVERTY AND DEPRIVATION 62 (Laurie Derose et
al., eds., 1998).
17.
See PROTECTING THE PUBLIC, supra note 14, at 59.
18.
DISASTERS EMERGENCIES COMM., THE EARTHQUAKE IN GUJARAT, INDIA:
REPORT OF A MONITORING VISIT FOR THE DISASTERS EMERGENCY COMMITTEE
27

(2001), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/ACOS64C64L?
OpenDocument.
19.
See FOOD AID FOR FOOD SECURITY, supra note 1, ch. 4.
20.
United Nations Dev. Program, DISASTER ASSESSMENT 24 (2nd ed. 1994),
available at http://proventionconsortium.org/themes/default/pdfs/DisasterAssess.pdf.
21.
Id.
22.
See SPHERE PROJECT, HUMANITARIAN CHARTER AND MINIMUM STANDARDS
IN DISASTER RESPONSE 155 (2004). Thus, for example, WFP has observed that high-

energy biscuits "are often the most adequate food commodity in the first two weeks of a
crisis, both during the initial acute phase during which the affected population would
not be able to cook due to displacement or lack of access to the basic facilities (clean
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However, even when a disaster causes food needs, it does not
necessarily follow that international assistance is required. In fact,
the overwhelming majority of disasters are addressed entirely by
affected communities, domestic authorities, national Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies, and other domestic actors. 23
Thus, for
instance, while 790 natural disasters were recorded worldwide in
2006,24 international assistance was reportedly provided for only 46
25
of them.
C. Providersof Food Aid in Sudden-Impact Disasters
Where international relief is required, it might be provided by a
variety of actors. According to INTERFAIS, as of 2005, governments
provided ninety-five percent of all food aid, and the United States
alone provided forty-nine percent of the global total. 26 However,
donors channeled that aid in different ways: fifty-four percent was
routed through "multilateral channels", twenty-four percent was
provided through NGOs, and only twenty-two percent was provided
27
directly by governments of assisting states.
Nearly all of the "multilateral" aid went to just one agency,
WFP. 28 However, a majority of that aid was then "sub-contracted" for
distribution to NGOs (in addition to the twenty-four percent that they
received from governments directly) 29 and, particularly in the
30
emergency context, national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
Thus, these non-governmental actors were involved in the
31
distribution of approximately two-thirds of all food aid.

water and cooking equipment[.]"
World Food Programme, Regional Emergency
PreparednessOperationto Pre-positionHigh Energy Biscuits in Latin America and the
Caribbean, at 2, EMOP 10487.0 (2005), available at http://www.wfp.org/operations/
current.operations/project-docs/104870.pdf.
23.
See OHCA, FTS, Natural Disasters in 2006, http://ocha.unog.ch/fts2/
pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencies&section=ND&Year=2006 (last visited Oct.
9, 2007) [hereinafter Natural Disasters in 2006 (listing the only 46 natural disasters
that received international funding in 2006).
24.
Em-Dat
Emergency
Disasters
Data
Base,
http://www.emdat.net/disasters/list.php (choose "All Countries," "2006," and "Natural"; then follow
"Next Step").
25.
See NaturalDisastersin 2006, supra note 23.
26.
See Food Aid Monitor, supra note 3, at 29.
27.
See id. at 23.
28.

See SOPHIA MURPHY & KATHY MCAFEE, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL'Y,

U.S. FOOD AID: TIME TO GET IT RIGHT 14 (2005) (noting that WFP "handles about 98
percent of multilateral food aid").
29.
See Food Aid Monitor, supra note 3, at 23.
30.
See Press Release, Int'l Fed'n of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies and
WFP Working Together in Southern Africa Food Crisis (Sept. 10, 2002), available at
http://www.ifrc.org/docs/News/pr02/6502.asp (announcing the cooperation of Red Cross
Red Crescent and WFP in "response to the unfolding food crisis in southern Africa").
31.
See Food Aid Monitor, supra note 3, at 23.
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Accordingly, although WFP is by far the largest single humanitarian
actor in this field, it is certainly not alone.
The foregoing highlights an overall trend of expansion in the
size, number, and diversity of actors involved in international
disaster relief. More "non-traditional" government donors, 32 more
national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, and more U.N.
agencies are becoming involved. The increased participation of the
NGO sector has been particularly dramatic. 33 It is estimated that
there are currently between 3,000 and 4,000 international NGOs in
Western countries, approximately 260 of which are regularly involved
34
in humanitarian relief.
The private sector and the general public are also taking an
increasing interest in international relief, particularly in suddenimpact disasters. This interest is manifested not only by large
donations to humanitarian actors in highly mediatised situations
(during the tsunami operation, private contributions to NGOs and
U.N. agencies were reportedly $5.5 billion, exceeding governmental
donations for the first time) but also by directly sending aid or
35
travelling to disaster sites in an effort to help.

III.

REGULATORY PROBLEMS FOR FOOD AID IN SUDDEN-IMPACT
DISASTERS

Notwithstanding this increasing diversity of food aid channels,
recent debates about food aid have mainly focused on legal
restrictions by donor states on the type, origin, and delivery methods

32.
GROUP,

See, e.g., ADELE HARMER & LIN COTTERRELL, HUMANITARIAN POLICY
DIVERSITY IN DONORSHIP: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF OFFICIAL

HUMANITARIAN AID 3 (2005) (noting that "[mlore and more governments are becoming
involved in the response to complex crises and natural disasters"); NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORG. [NATO], NATO's ROLE IN DISASTER ASSISTANCE 6 (2nd ed. 2001) (NATO
"[r]ecognizing the importance of enhanced international cooperation in the field of
disaster relief ....
"); Arjun Katoch, The Responders' Cauldron: The Uniqueness of
International Disaster Response, 59 J. INT'L AFFAIRS 153, 157 (2006) (recognizing a

"sudden influx of international agencies, NGOs, and increasingly, private companies
into a disaster site").
33.
See Abby Stoddard, HumanitarianNGOs: Challenges and Trends, in HPG
REPORT 14, 25 (2003), available at http://www.odi.org/uk/hpg/papers/hpgreportl4.pdf
(noting that NGOs are "controlling a larger share of humanitarian resources than ever
before").
34.
Id.
35.
See, e.g., Tom Phelan & Brent Woodworth, IBM Crisis Response Team Aids
Tsunami Recovery Efforts, Feb. 22, 2005, http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/
index.wss/summary/bcrs/a1009006?cntxt=a1000265 (last visited Sept. 3, 2007) (noting
that "[w]ithin four hours of the December 26th Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami,
IBM's Crisis Response Team was on the phone making contact with personnel in the
region, arranging to dispatch team members to the affected areas").
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of the aid they provide. 36 This debate is critical for both slow-onset
and sudden-impact disasters because the costs and particularly the
delay associated with these restrictions are substantial. However,
less attention has been paid to important quality and coordination
issues in food aid, particularly in sudden-impact disaster settings.
Moreover, these debates have not dwelt on the regulatory
problems on the receiving end of food aid. 37 Some of these problems
are
similar
to those
of any
international
transaction.
Notwithstanding the advances of globalization, it remains a complex
task to move goods, personnel, and organizations across borders.
However, in disaster relief settings, those complexities are magnified.
The regulatory capacity of the affected state government is frequently
reduced, and the political difficulties in accepting foreign assistance
can generate unique obstacles.
While this may be true in any kind of disaster, the factor of time
is particularly critical in sudden-impact disasters in light of the lack
of advance warning and opportunity for preparation. Moreover, due
38
to the greater "CNN effect" sudden-impact disasters can generate,
they are a greater draw for the newer actors in disaster relief
described above. While these actors have brought new energy and
resources to relief efforts, they have also aggravated some of the
common regulatory dilemmas.
A. Supply-Side Problems
1.

Tied Aid

Much of the controversy about food aid has centred on "tying,"
which has been defined as "loans or grants which are either in effect
tied to procurement of goods and services from the donor country or
which are subject to procurement modalities implying limited
geographic procurement eligibility. '39 For purposes of food aid, this

36.
See Olga Manda, Controversy Rages Over 'GM' Food Aid, AFRICA
RECOVERY, Feb. 2003, at 5 (noting the debate over genetically modified food aid);
Focus ON ETHIOPIA, Mar. 31, 2006, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db9OOsid
HMYT-6NJNEV?OpenDocument (discussing a debate over the efficacy of a new
delivery method for aid).
37.
See Manda, supra note 36; Focus ON ETHIOPIA, supra note 36 (none of
which discusses regulatory problems on the receiving end of food aid).
38.
See, e.g., INT'L FED'N OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, WORLD
DISASTERS REPORT 2005: FOCUS ON INFORMATION IN DISASTERS 130 (2005) (hereinafter
WORLD DISASTERS REPORT 2005) (noting that a 2002 volcanic eruption in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo generated an unprecedented media response
whereas the sporadic and complex armed conflict that had been ongoing there for years
had failed to capture headlines).
39.
DEv. ASSISTANCE COMM., OECD, Guiding Principles for Associated
Financing and Tied and Partially Untied Official Development Assistance, in
DIRECTIVES FOR REPORTING TO THE CREDITOR REPORTING SYSTEM AID ACTIVITY
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generally refers to restrictions as to where food aid may be purchased
40
and how it may be transported.
In the United States, nearly all official food aid is required by
national law to be provided in-kind from domestic sources, and
seventy-five percent of it must be transported by American
shipping. 41
These requirements have been associated with
heightened costs and substantial delays. For example, a 2007 report
by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) found
that domestic shipping requirements generated an average of $134
million in additional costs from 2001 to 2005.42 Similarly, a multidonor study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) in 2006 concluded that "[t]he actual cost of tied
direct food aid transfers was, on average, approximately 50% more
than local food purchases, and 33% more costly than procurement of
food in third countries. '43 Moreover, it has been reported that "[flood
aid shipments from the U.S. take an average of five months to reach
'44
their destination-making them pointless for rapid response.
Other large donors, such as Australia, Canada, and Denmark,
also provide the large majority of their food aid as in-kind
shipments. 45 In contrast, the European Union (E.U.) has changed its
rules to privilege local purchases (i.e., purchasing food aid within the

DATABASE Annex 2, § 2, 5 (1987). Under these guidelines, aid is considered "partially
tied" if sourcing options are limited but include "substantially all developing countries."
Id.
40.
See OECD, THE DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS OF FOOD AID: DOES TYING
MATTER? 40-42 (2005) [hereinafter DOES TYING MATTER?].
41.
See MURPHY, supra note 28, at 14.
42.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, No. GAO-07-95T, FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE- VARIOUS CHALLENGES LIMIT THE EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S.
FOOD AID 9 (2007).
43.
Id. at 12.
44.
MURPHY, supra note 28, at 30. To a limited extent, these problems have
been offset in emergency situations through diversion of foods in the pipeline destined
for development purposes, pre-positioning of food stocks, and small-scale local
purchases permitted through a separate fund administered by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID). See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, supra note 45, at 9-10; Thomas Marchione, Foods Provided through the U.S.
Government Emergency Food Aid Programs: Policies and Customs Governing their
Formulation,Selection and Distribution,132 J. NUTRITION 2107S (2002). USAID also
has statutory authority to waive certain rules when providing emergency assistance for
natural disasters. However, the agency has interpreted this authority (known as
"notwithstanding authority" because of the wording of the relevant provision) as
disallowing it to depart from domestic sourcing requirements. See Andrew S. Natsios,
Administrator, U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., Remarks at the Kansas City Export Food Aid
Conference (May 3, 2005), available at www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2005/
sp050503.html ("I have been told in no uncertain terms by our USAID lawyers that we
cannot use our notwithstanding authority for local purchases.").
45.
See DOES TYING MATTER?, supra note 43, at 58 (table showing that the
three countries each send the vast majority of their aid in the form of "Direct
Transfers").
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affected state) and "triangular purchases" (i.e., purchasing food aid
outside of the donor and affected state, usually in a nearby developing
state).46 Still, even cash-only transactions can be slow if accompanied
by significant bureaucracy. It has been asserted that "[tihe E.U.
disbursement of food aid funds is so slow that the timing of their
'4 7
assistance... can make it less useful than in-kind donations.
In addition to issues of costs and delay, concerns have long been
voiced about the appropriateness of in-kind food as a type of response
in many situations, particularly in light of its potential impact on
local agricultural markets and the dependency and resiliency of
affected communities. 48 These arguments have been primarily aimed
at slow-impact disaster settings, though even in sudden-impact
disasters, it has been argued that "food aid-especially food aid
sourced from donor countries-is often overemphasized" because food
49
can be available in unaffected parts of the affected state.
Defenders of aid tying-particularly in the United States-argue
that, by benefiting domestic agricultural and shipping interests, these
rules create a political constituency in support of food aid in whose
absence much less aid would be provided to people in need. 50 In other
words, imperfect aid is better than no aid at all. Indeed, in response
to E.U. arguments made during Doha Round trade negotiations in
2005 that U.S. food aid was a disguised export subsidy, the United
States noted the substantial decline in European food assistance
51
since 1995 in conjunction with its "cash-only" orientation.
Nevertheless, the Bush administration has subsequently proposed
that U.S. law be changed in order to allow one quarter of the budget
52
for emergency food aid to be used for local or triangular purchases.
2.

Food Quality

Aside from the appropriateness of in-kind food in general, there
have also been serious questions as to the type and quality of foods

46.
Id. at 26.
47.
MURPHY, supra note 28, at 30.
48.
See Food Aid for Food Security, supra note 1, at 32-46.
49.
See id. at 48-49. Cf. Oxfam, Making the Case for Cash: Humanitarian
Food Aid Under Scrutiny, Oxfam Briefing Note, at 3 (Apr. 8, 2005) (arguing that the
long delivery delay of US food aid pledged to Sri Lanka and Indonesia after the
tsunami would lead to its arrival just as local harvests were occurring and act to
depress prices).
50.
See DOES TYING MATTER?, supra note 45, at 36.
51.
See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of State, U.S. Disagrees with EU's "Cash
Only" Food Assistance Policy (Jan. 6, 2006), available at http://usinfo.state.govei/
Archive/2006/JanI09.13090.html (noting that "[c]urrently, the European Union
provides less than 1.5 million tons a year of overall food assistance while the United
States has remained consistent at 4 million tons of food a year").
52.
Celia Dugger, Bush Administration Gains Support for New Approach on
Global Food Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2007.
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provided in response to disasters. Most disturbing is the evidence of
differing standards of quality of aid provided to European and noncertain
European countries. 53 In other cases, it has seemed that
54
types of food were "dumped" on disaster-affected countries.
For example, after the 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran, highprotein biscuits were distributed with the label: "gift for the children
of Afghanistan." 55 Similarly, after the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia,
customs officials measured the amounts of expired foods they had
received-some with expiration dates over a year old-by the
truckload. 56 Similar problems were reported in Sri Lanka during the
57
same disaster.
The donation of culturally insensitive or otherwise unusable
foods is also common and raises significant local ire. For example,
canned pork was shipped to the predominately Muslim population of
Aceh, Indonesia, after the tsunami. 58 Also, in the early days of the
operation, when clean water was unavailable or severely rationed,
dried noodles and sacks of rice were imported. 5 9 Several years
earlier, in Bam, donated rice was provided that included broken
kernels at a rate of twenty-five percent, which is considered suitable
for human consumption but was not acceptable to the Iranian
In 2001, whole maize was delivered to persons
population. 60

53.

See PATRICK WEBB, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, FOOD AS AID:

TRENDS,

NEEDS AND CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 19 (Occasional Papers No. 14, 2003)

(noting that, in 1998, "20 percent of food aid deliveries to the Europe and NIS region
comprised high-value, non-cereal commodities," a "much higher share than anywhere
else in the world"); Marchione, supra note 44, at 2105S n.4.
See, e.g. infra notes 58-60.
54.
55 Bam Workshop Report, supra note 15, at 14.
JOHN TELFORD & JOHN COSGRAVE, TSUNAMI EVALUATION COALITION, JOINT
56.
EVALUATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 52 (2006) [hereinafter TEC SYNTHESIS REPORT].
57.
See INT'L FED'N OF THE RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, LEGAL
ISSUES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE TSUNAMI IN SRI LANKA 19 (2006),
available at http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/pubs/idrl/report-srilanka.pdf [hereinafter IFRC
Sri Lanka Report]. This is not only hazardous for the health of disaster-affected
persons, but clearly touches an emotional cord in the affected state, as evidenced by the
scandals that erupted over accusations that China had donated expired baby food to
Indonesia after the tsunami and that Iran had donated expired canned food to
Pakistan after the October 2005 earthquake. See Indonesia Checks Claim China
Donated Expired Food to Victims, ASIAN ECON. NEWS (Kyodo), Jan. 18, 2005;
Earthquake Relief Food Not Expired, Says Iranian Diplomat, DAILY TIMES (Lahore,
Pak.), Jan. 20, 2006. In both cases, the concerned governments asserted that there had
been a misreading of the packaging, which was not in locally-understood languages.
58.
See TEC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 56, at 52.
KIRSTEN SCHULZE, LONDON SCH. OF ECON., BETWEEN CONFLICT AND
59.
PEACE: TSUNAMI AID AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ACEH 14 (2005), available at
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityReport/Tsunami/Aceh%
20Tsunami%20Response.pdf.
60.
See Bam Workshop Report, supra note 15, at 52. Should this appear
capricious, it is notable that, in the U.S., broken rice at a rate higher than four percent
is generally used only in dog food. See Sage V Foods, The Composition of Rice and the
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displaced by flooding along the Zambezi River in Mozambique,
61
notwithstanding their lack of any utensil to grind or prepare it.
Similarly, a number of recipient states have begun resisting
genetically-modified food as food aid. Though this debate has mainly
arisen in the context of drought, as in Southern Africa,62 it was also
raised in the sudden-impact disaster context after the 1999 hurricane
in Orissa, India. 63 The United States has argued that geneticallymodified food is safe and that speculative concerns about its effects
should not interfere with feeding persons in crisis. In any event,
since no regulatory attempt has been made in the U.S. to segregate
genetically-modified crops, it is reasonable to assume that all U.S.
food aid has some genetically-modified component.6 4 However, in
addition to health concerns, many states are worried about
contamination of their crops and the possibility of losing European
65
markets.
B. Coordinationand Professionalism
The inherent delays in governmental food aid discussed above
are sometimes aggravated when donors fail to adequately coordinate
their efforts in a particular disaster. 66 Implementing agencies are
then "faced with a situation in which they must borrow or stretch the
available commodity until commitments are filled. ''6 7 Both donors
and humanitarian actors have also frequently succumbed to the
temptation to compete for recognition as the first to respond to a
particular disaster. For example, the International Federation of Red

Various Processed Types, http://www.sagevfoods.coniMainPages/RicelOl/Types.htm#
broken (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
61.
ACTIONAID, FOOD AID: AN ACTIONAID BRIEFING PAPER 14 (2003), available
at http://www.actionaid.org/docs/food-aid-briefing.pdf.
62.
See Nicole Itano, Even Hungry Africa Wary of Gene-Modified Food,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 6, 2002, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
2002/0806/pOlsO3-woaf.html (illustrating the official debate over whether to accept
gene-modified foods). But see Sudan's U-Turn on 'GM'FoodAid, BBC NEWS, Apr. 26,
2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6594947.stm (noting that Sudan had
resisted in-kind food aid for the conflict situation in Darfur).
63.
See Mike Woolridge, US "Dumped"GM Food in Orissa, BBC NEWS, June 3,
2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/southasia/775326.stm (noting an
accusation by an Indian environmental activist accusing "the United States
Government of dumping genetically-engineered food on victims of last October's cyclone
in Orissa").
64.
See STEVEN HANSCH ET AL., INST. FOR THE STUDY OF INT'L MIGRATION,
GENETICALLY-MODIFIED FOOD IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOOD CRISIS OF 2002-2003 8
(2004) (noting that it would be "impossible for anyone to say or know which bag of
maize in any market is GM").
65.
Meron Tesda Michael, Africa Bites the Bullet on Genetically Modified Food
Aid, WORLDPRESS.ORG, Sept. 26, 2002, available at http://www.worldpress.org/
Africa737.cfm.
66.
See Marchione, supra note 44, at 2109S.
67.
Id.
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Cross and Red Crescent Societies' World DisastersReport referred to
Aceh as an "information black hole" after the tsunami due to the lack
of communication among relief providers, their consequent
duplication of efforts in some areas, and their failure to serve needy
68
populations in other areas.
In some cases, moreover, humanitarian actors have failed to live
up to professional standards. For instance, in Bam, a large number of
the international "volunteers" who arrived to assist victims of the
earthquake themselves had to be provided shelter and food by the
Iranian Red Crescent Society. 69 In Thailand, after the 2004 tsunami,
there were claims that some Christian charities were conditioning aid
on religious conversion or participation in religious activities. 70 In
general, there were many new and inexperienced actors responding to
the tsunami in the several countries it affected and they were "more
71
commonly associated with inappropriate aid.'
C. Receiving-State Problems
In contrast to the detailed rules of donor states about their food
aid, very few states have comprehensive laws for policies concerning
the receipt of international disaster relief. As a result, confusion
frequently reigns after a major sudden-impact disaster; the affected
state's government finds that it must suddenly create rules and
procedures to handle foreign assistance while also trying to organize
In these circumstances, and in light of the
its own response.
multiplicity of international actors and domestic agencies involved, it
is no surprise that some important matters fall through the cracks.
The following are some examples of common problems.
1.

Delayed Requests

Both political and administrative factors can complicate the
initiation of international relief. It is often difficult for a government
to admit that it requires international assistance for fear of appearing
weak and damaging national pride. 72 However, more often, delay is

See WORLD DISASTERS REPORT 2005, supra note 38, at ch. 4 (2005).
69.
B. CHOMILIER ET AL., OPERATIONS REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS RED
CRESCENT MOVEMENT RESPONSE TO THE EARTHQUAKE IN BAM, IRAN 12 (2004) (an
68.

internal evaluation on file with author).
See INT'L FED'N OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, LEGAL ISSUES
70.
IN THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE TSUNAMI IN THAILAND 21 (2006), available at

http://www.ifrc.org/idrl (noting "accusations of aid being provided on condition of
conversion or participation in religious activities") [hereinafter IFRC Thailand Report].
71.
See TEC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 56, at 56.
72.
Int'l Fed'n of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies, European Forum on
International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles (IRDL), Antalya, Turk.,
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due to administrative confusion or slow needs-assessment
procedures. 73
Most
governments
and
inter-governmental
organizations, such as WFP, will refrain from sending relief until a
request has been officially transmitted.
2.

Barriers to the Entry of Food Aid

Even after the affected state has requested international
assistance, food aid and other international disaster relief items are
frequently delayed in customs. For example, as of April 2006, there
was a backlog of 1,154 containers of tsunami relief in Sri Lanka's
customs. 74 Over a year after the tsunami struck Indonesia, over 400
75
containers of relief goods were still awaiting customs clearance.
These included shipments of food aid that had expired while in
customs custody. In 2002, it was reported that an $80,000 shipment
of relief supplies, including food items, gathered by the Jamaican
diaspora community in Atlanta, GA, was still on the docks in
Kingston three months after it arrived to assist persons affected by
76
flooding.
The sheer volume and lack of standardization of international
relief has an important part to play in blocking the speedy entry of
food aid and other critical relief items. For example, after Hurricane
Mitch in 1998, it was reported that ports in Honduras became so
clogged with private donations of used clothing, bottled water, and
canned food that vital machinery and water pipes could not get
through. 77 Moreover, abuses by a few actors with respect to postdisaster relaxation in customs rules can result in abrupt shifts in
procedure. 78 For example, in both Sri Lanka (after the tsunami) and
Guatemala (after Tropical Storm Stan), customs officials insisted on
individually inspecting relief shipments after discovering instances

May 25, 2006, Report, at 3-4, (2006) available at http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/pubs/idrl
euro-forum-freport.pdf [hereinafter European IDRL Forum Report].
73.
World Food Summit, Nov. 13-17, 1996, Technical Background Documents
for the World Food Summit, ch. 13,
3.14 (noting that "the import displacement time
for international food aid has usually been long because of the time it takes
governments to assess the disaster situation and food aid needs and to find or request
from donors the finances or commodities required").
74.
See IFRC Sri Lanka Report, supra note 57, at 17.
75.
See INT'L FED'N OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, LEGAL ISSUES
IN THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE TSUNAMI IN INDONESIA 21 (2006) [hereinafter
IFRC Indonesia Report].
76.
Flood Relief Shipment Stuck on the Docks, JAMAICA GLEANER, Sept. 27,
2002, available at http://www.jamaica-gleaner.comgleaner/20020927/lead/lead5.html.
77.
See Press Release, Lutheran World Foundation, Relief Experts Call for
"Responsible Response" (Jan. 3, 2005), available at http://www.waveofgiving.org/news/
010305.asp.
78.
See INT'L FEDN OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, LEGAL ISSUES
FROM THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO TROPICAL STORM STAN IN GUATEMALA, at 19
(2007), available at http://www.ifrc.org/idrl [hereinafter Tropical Storm Stan].
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where contraband items, such as arms and narcotics, were hidden
79
among food shipments.
Moreover, complexities in domestic food importation rules and
confusion about their operation (both from the international and
domestic side) can cause significant problems. A dramatic example of
this occurred in the United States after Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
when the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) belatedly
discovered that 500,000 "meals ready to eat" (MREs), donated by the
British military and already in distribution, contained British beef,
which had been banned in the United States since 1997.80 The
remaining MREs were thus gathered back up and stored at
significant expense until the U.S. government was able to locate
foreign recipients willing to take them (including a contingent of
border guards in the Republic of Georgia).8 1
3.

Obstacles to Effective Distribution of Food Aid

Of course, food is not the only item that is required in order to
undertake a food relief operation. Non-food items, such as cooking
utensils, water containers, and equipment such as vehicles, radios,
and satellite telephones, can be indispensable parts of a food aid
operation in a sudden-impact disaster setting.8 2 Like food, these
items (particularly the latter three) are also often trapped in
83
customs,because their importation is usually highly regulated.
Likewise, complexities in obtaining exemptions from customs duties
and storage charges for such items have proven to be impediments to
relief in a number of recent disasters, including the tsunami and the
84
1999 earthquake in Turkey.
Moreover, such relief operations require personnel, some of
whom frequently must enter from outside of the country. Their
initial entry is usually not problematic, as affected states are
commonly liberal in providing tourist visas or waiving entry visas.
However, it can be difficult to maintain visa status long enough to
complete a relief operation. After the 2004 tsunami, in both Thailand
and Indonesia, international personnel (including not only NGO, but
also U.N. and even foreign government personnel) were required to

79.
See IFRC Sri Lanka Report, supra note 57, at 20; Tropical Storm Stan,
supra note 81, at 19.
80.
See ANNE C. RICHARD, ROLE REVERSAL: OFFERS OF HELP FROM OTHER
COUNTRIES IN RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 17-18 (2006).

81.
Id. at 18-19.
82.
European IDRL Forum Report, supra note 75, at 4.
83.
See id.
84.
See e.g., IFRC Sri Lanka Report, supra note 57, at 21; Turkish Red
Crescent Society, International Disaster Response Law: 1999 Marmara Earthquake
Case Study, at 35-36 (2006), available at http://www.ifrc.org/idrl.
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repeatedly leave and re-enter the country in order to maintain their
85
legal status.
Particularly for NGOs, the lack of domestic legal personality of
their organizations can also be a substantial problem. For example,
in Thailand, registration procedures were so opaque that few
international NGOs responding to the 2004 tsunami were able to
penetrate them.8 6 As a result, NGOs suffered significant uncertainty
about the duration of their permitted stay, obstacles in opening bank
87
accounts, and other administrative problems.
88
IV. THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL REGIME

A. Food Aid-Specific Instruments
There are several specific global instruments concerning food
aid. However, these instruments address only supply-side issues and
have seen only limited success in implementation.
The oldest such instrument is the non-binding FAO Principles of
Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations of 1954 (hereinafter,
the "FAO Principles"), which were primarily designed to monitor the
disposal of agricultural surpluses as food aid, and to ensure that food
aid did not displace commercial imports.8 9 The FAO Consultative
Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposals (CSSD) was set up to receive
reports on food aid and monitor performance with these Principles.
However, in recent years, donors have increasingly ignored the
CSSD, such that less than five percent of global food aid flows were
reported in 2005.90
In 1967, the first version of the Food Aid Convention (FAC) was
adopted as a component of the International Grains Agreement. The
current version of the FAC was adopted in 1999 with an effective life
of three years. 9 1 It has been renewed several times since then, most

85.
See IFRC Thailand Report, supra note 70, at 15-16; IFRC Indonesia
Report, supra note 75.
86.
See IFRC Thailand Report, supra note 70, at 13-14.
87.
See id. at 19, 26.
88.
For a thorough discussion of existing instruments pertinent to
international disaster relief, see Victoria Bannon, Strengthening Disaster Response
Laws, Rules and Principles: Overview of the Current System and a New Way Forward,
in TSUNAMI AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT: LAW AND GOVERNANCE (C. Raj Kumar &
D.K. Srivastava eds., 2006).
89.
See MURPHY, supra note 28, at 14.
90.
See id. at 15.
91.
The Food Aid Convention is one of two components of the International
Grains Agreement of 1995. International Grains Agreement, July 1, 1995, 1882
U.N.T.S. 195, 195, 327 available at http://www.igc.org.uklen/downloads/brochure/
iga1995.pdf.
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recently in 2007, and is valid though June 30, 2008.92 The FAC has
twenty-three parties, all of whom are donors, including twenty-two
93
states and the European Community.
The FAC sets out minimum commitments of annual food aid of
certain types 94 to be provided by each member to certain recipient
states, 95 covering both emergency and non-emergency situations.
"Eligible" food aid (i.e., aid that may be counted toward the agreed
quotas) may include both bilateral assistance as well as aid provided
through multilateral organizations and NGOs. 96 It also has a number
of provisions on how aid should be provided. Among these provisions
are requirements (added for the first time in the 1999 version) that
food aid must:
97
" respect "basic humanitarian principles";
" be provided "only when it is the most effective and
appropriate means of assistance"; 98
" "meet international quality standards [and] be consistent
with the dietary habits and nutritional needs of recipients"; 99
" be based on needs assessments by both the recipient and
donor states; 00
" take particular account of the needs of women, children and
vulnerable groups, 1° 1 and ensure the participation of women
02
in decision-making on operations;
" avoid harmful effects on local harvests, production and
trade; 0 3 and

92.
See United Nations Treaty Collection website, http://untreaty.un.org
(available by subscription only).
93.
Id. By its terms, ratification or access to the treaty is limited to a
prescribed list, or those approved by the Food Aid Committee.
See Food Aid
Convention arts. XXII-XXIII, July 1, 1995, 1882 U.N.T.S. 327.
94.
The "eligible products"-those that a member state can report toward its
agreed annual quota-are grains, grain and rice products of primary or secondary
processing, pulses, edible oil, root crops, skimmed milk powder, sugar, seed for eligible
products, micronutrients and, to a limited extent, other products "which are a
component of the traditional diet of vulnerable groups or ...of supplementary feeding
programs." Food Aid Convention, supra note 96, art. IV(a). The Convention does not
limit contributions of other types of foods, but they cannot be counted toward the
member's quota. Id. art. V(b). The Convention also includes grants of "cash to be used
to purchase food for or by the recipient country." Id. art. IX(a)(i).
95.
See id. art. VIII & Annex B.
96.
See id. art. XI(a). Member states are urged to give "full consideration to the
advantages of directing food aid through multilateral channels, in particular the World
Food Programme." Id. art. XI(b).
97.
Id. art. VIII(d).
98.
Id. art. VIII(a).
99.
Id. art. 1(j).
100.
Id. art. VIII(b).
101.
Id. art. VII(b)-(c).
102.
Id. art. XIII(a)(iii).
103.
Id. arts. XIII(a)(i), IX (d).
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take into account, even in emergency situations, "longer-term
04
rehabilitation and development objectives.'

The FAC also sets up a governing body of representatives of all
members called the Food Aid Committee, and tasked with monitoring
progress and addressing problems arising under the FAC on the basis
105
of consensus.
The detailed quality standards highlighted above, particularly
with regard to the "do-no-harm" approach and the involvement of
beneficiaries, are the most progressive of any existing binding
instrument related to disasters. 10 6 Even so, the FAC has come under
severe criticism for underperformance. 107 The quota system has been
of negligible value because the amounts have been set significantly
lower than the usual food aid commitments of nearly all of the
signatories.' 0 8
Non-donor states are specifically excluded from
membership and thus from discussions on implementation. 0 9 The
types of food covered remain limited (although greatly expanded as of
1999). Moreover, much of the FAC's operative language is quite
weak. For instance, Article XII, on local purchases and triangular
transactions, merely calls on members to "give consideration" to these
options. 110 Finally, the Food Aid Committee has extremely limited
powers of enforcement,"' and it is unclear if it has had much effect
on compliance.
As of the writing of this Article, the future of the Convention
remains in some doubt. A planned renegotiation of its provisions was
postponed pending satisfactory resolution of the trade issues raised in
the Doha Round of the WTO (as discussed above), and this has not
yet been accomplished. Currently, the main reference to food aid in
the WTO legal structure is in Article 10(4) of the Agreement on

104.
Id. art. VII(d).
105.
Id. arts. XV-XVI.
106.
But see Agreement on Agriculture, art. 10.4(a)-(b), Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) (stating that the
Agreement on Agriculture only permits food aid that is "not tied directly or indirectly to
commercial exports" and stipulates that food aid transactions must be "carried out in
accordance with the FAO 'Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consultative
Obligations."').
107.
See, e.g., ACTIONAID, supra note 61 at 9-10; H. Bruce Huff & Michelle
Jimenez, The Food Aid Convention: Past Performance and Future Role within the New
Global Trade and Development Environment (presented to the International
Conference on Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where are We Heading?,
Capri, Italy, June 23-26, 2003).
108.
See Food Aid for Food Security, supra note 1, at 19.
109.
See Food Aid Convention, supra note 96, art. XII.
110.
Id. art. XII(a) (FAC requirements use non-obligatory "should" standards).
111.
Oxfam Int'l, Food Aid or Hidden Dumping?: Separating Wheat from Chaff,
at 7, 15 (2005) (noting that these rules are not enforced and are considered to have had
little impact in limiting the distortions of the market).
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Agriculture, which calls on members to (1) ensure that food aid is not
"tied directly or indirectly to commercial exports of agricultural
products to recipient countries," (2) comply with the FAO Principles,
and (3) ensure that aid is no less concessional (i.e., no more like a
commercial sale) than what would be covered under the FAC.
Though not solely directed at food aid, it is pertinent in this
context also to mention the OECD's Development Assistance
Committee, which also had food-aid issues very much in mind when it
adopted its 2001 "Recommendation on Untying Official Development
Assistance
to the Least
Developed Countries.' 1 2
The
recommendation calls on OECD members to progressively "untie"
their bilateral aid to certain countries, in particular the leastdeveloped countries. Similarly, it is noteworthy that the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety of 2000 (which now has 141 parties, not
including the United States) requires exporting states to provide
advance notification that they are exporting genetically-modified
organisms, including food, in order to provide the receiving state an
113
opportunity to refuse them.
B. The Right to Food
14
Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"
and Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic Social
n5
among other instruments, 116
and Cultural Rights (CESCR),
provide for a human right to food as an element of the right to an
adequate standard of living. Though not specifically articulated with
regard to food aid, this right to food has been interpreted to be
relevant both to supply-side and receiving-end issues in its food
delivery. 117

112.

See

ASSISTANCE

OECD, RECOMMENDATION ON UNTYING OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT
TO
THE
LEAST
DEVELOPED
Countries,
OECD
Doc.

DCD/DAC(2001)12/FINAL (Apr. 25, 2001), amended by DCD/DAC(2006)25 &
DCD/DAC/M(2006)3 (Mar. 15, 2006).
113.
See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027, 1030-31.
114.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 76, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
115.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11(1),
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
116.
See also Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 11(1), Sept. 2, 1990,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, July 11, 1990,
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12, Nov. 17,
1988, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 69, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human
Rights in the Inter-American System, at 67, OEAISer.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1(1992);
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art.
12(2), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 513.
117.
See Comm. on Social, Econ. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Cmt. No. 12,
9,
16, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) (giving examples where a right to adequate
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The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights' General
Comment No. 12 on "the right to adequate food" asserted that the
right to food in the CESCR includes a core right to be free of
hunger.' 18 That right is violated if hunger exists in a member state's
territory and it cannot show that it has made "every effort" to address9
it immediately, including seeking international assistance."
Arguably, therefore, failures to adequately facilitate international
relief (in areas such as customs, taxation and visas) would impinge on
this right. Moreover, the Committee asserted that the right to food
implied certain duties with regard to international assistance, stating
that "[sitates parties should take steps to respect the enjoyment of
the right to food in other countries, to protect that right, to facilitate
access to food and to provide the necessary aid when required," and
that
food aid should, as far as possible, be provided in ways which do not
adversely affect local producers and local markets, and should be
organized in ways that facilitate the return to food self-reliance of the
beneficiaries. Such aid should be based on the needs of the intended
beneficiaries. Products included in international food trade or aid
programmes must be safe and culturally acceptable to the recipient
120
population.

In 2004, FAO's Committee on World Food Security and its
governing council adopted the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the
Progressive Realisation of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context
of National Food Security. 121 The Guidelines provide that states
"should provide food assistance to those in need, may request
international assistance if their own resources do not suffice, and
should facilitate safe and unimpeded access for international
assistance in accordance with international law and universally
recognized humanitarian principles, bearing in mind local
circumstances, dietary traditions and cultures.' 1 22 Specifically with
regard to food aid, the Guidelines call on donors to (1) "examine their
relevant policies and, if necessary, review them to support national
efforts by recipient States to progressively realize the right to
adequate food in the context of national food security," (2) undertake

food would have been violated by the prevention of access to humanitarian food aid in
internal conflicts or other emergency situations).
Id. 8.
118.
Id.
17.
119.
Id. 36.
120.
121.
See generally Isabelle Rae et al, The Right to Food as a Fundamental
Human Right: FAO's Experience (2005), http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/2004200512004-2005-4/papers/rae-thomas-vidar.pdf.
See FAO, Intergovernmental Working Group, Voluntary Guidelines to
122.
Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of
16.6, FAO Doc. No. CL 127/10-Sup.1 (Sept. 23,
National Food Security, Annex 1,
2004).
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joint needs assessments with affected states, and (3) provide
assistance that "takes into account the importance of food safety, local
and regional food production capacity and benefits, and the
'123
nutritional needs, as well as culture of recipient populations.
Though both are very useful in their own way, the contrast
between the Committee's aggressive interpretation of the right to
food and the much milder duties foreseen by states in the Voluntary
Guidelines illustrates some of the difficulty of relying on humanrights principles to tackle operational problems in food aid
operations.
C. Disaster Treaties
There are also a number of treaties in sectors other than food aid
that have provisions on facilitation and cooperation in disaster relief
that may be pertinent to a particular food aid operation. These
include treaties in the areas of nuclear accidents, 124 weapons
control1 25 sea and air transport, 126 telecommunications, 1 27 health
emergencies, 128 civil defense, 129 and customs, 130 as well as mutual
assistance treaties at the regional level. 13 1 For the most part,

123.
Id. Annex 2, 13.
124.
See, e.g., Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents,
Mar. 17, 1992, 2105 U.N.T.S. 460; Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear
Accident or Radiological Emergency, Sept. 26, 1986, 1457 U.N.T.S. 134.
125.
See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, art. 8, Jan. 13,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 804; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, art. 7, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583.
126.
See, e.g., Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic,
Annex 1, §§ 5.11-5.12, Apr. 9, 1965, 591 U.N.T.S 265; Convention on International Civil
Aviation of 1944, Annex 9, § 8.8, Dec. 7, 1944, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES:
FACILITATION-ANNEX 9 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION (12th
ed. 2005).

127.
See Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources
for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations of 1998, art. 3, June 18, 1998, available
at
http://www.ifrc.org/what/disasters/idrl/publication.asp
[hereinafter
Tampere
Convention].
128.
See World Health Org., World Health Assembly, Revision of the
International Health Regulations: Agenda Item 13.1, Res. No. WHA58.3 (May 23,
2005).
129.
See Framework Convention on Civil Defense Assistance, May 22, 2000,
available at http://www.ifrc.org/what/disasters/idrl/publication.asp.
130.
See International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of
Customs Procedures, May 18, 1973, T.I.A.S. 6633; Protocol of Amendment to the
International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs
Procedures, Annex J.5, June
26, 1999, available at http://www.ifrc.org/
what/disasters/idrl/publication.asp.
131.
See, e.g., ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency
Response, July 26, 2005, available at http://www.aseansec.org; Agreement among the
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however, these treaties either have few parties, vague language, or do
not address non-state actors.
D. Privilegesand Immunities

In contrast, while not specific to disasters, the law of privileges
and immunities provides very specific rights for facilitation-in the
areas of customs, visas, and domestic legal personality, among
others132-that are clearly relevant to the types of receiving-end
problems identified in this article. Whereas diplomatic and consular
staff benefit from privileges and immunities as a matter of customary
law, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961,133
and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963,134
governmental food relief personnel are extremely unlikely to fall
under these categories. For this reason, a number of donors have
entered into bilateral treaties with affected states to guarantee
3 5
equivalent protections and rights.
In contrast, WFP, as a joint programme of the United Nations
and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), 136 enjoys
privileges and immunities under both the Convention on Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946,137 and the Convention
on Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of 1947.138
In addition, in every country in which it maintains a presence, WFP
enters into specific headquarters agreements reiterating its rights
under the aforementioned treaties and providing more specific detail
as to operating privileges. Thus, to the extent that WFP has suffered
from the kinds of receiving-end problems described in this Article

Governments of the Participating States of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
(BSEC) on Collaboration in Emergency Assistance and Emergency Response to Natural
and Man-Made Disasters, Apr. 15, 1998, availableat http://www.bsec-organization.org;
Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Assistance in Cases of Disaster, June 7, 1991,
availableat http://www.oas.org/legallintro.htm.
132.
See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
ch.17 (6th ed. 2003); JEAN SALMON, MANUEL DE DROIT DIPLOMATIQUE ch. 5 (Bruylant
1994).
133.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S.
95.
134.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
135.
See Horst Fischer, InternationalDisaster Response Law Treaties: Trends,
Patterns and Lacunae, in INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE LAWS, PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE: REFLECTIONS, PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 29-39 (Victoria Bannon ed.,
Int'l Fed'n of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies 2003).
136.
See World Food Programme, G.A. Res. 1714 (XVI), 16th Sess., 1084th plen.
mtg. (Dec. 19, 1961); Continuation of the World Food Programme, G.A. Res. 2095 (XX),
20th Sess., 1404th plen. mtg. (Dec. 20, 1965).
137.
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb.
13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15.
138.
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies,
Nov. 21, 1947, 33 U.N.T.S. 261.
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(and it has on numerous occasions),' 3 9 it is not for lack of rights under
international law.
Likewise, due to their unique status in
international law, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies and the International Committee of the Red Cross
have entered into numerous headquarters agreements with host
140
states guaranteeing them similar privileges and immunities.
However, while many of the large development-oriented NGOs
have agreements with states where they work, these agreements
rarely provide the same range of privileges and immunities
guaranteed to the above actors.
Moreover, with the striking
exception of the Tampere Convention on the Provision of
Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief
Operations of 1998,141 no treaty provides diplomatic-style privileges
and immunities to NGOs.
E. Recommendations, Resolutions, and Codes
One document that would be of use to both governmental and
non-governmental actors, and one of the most specific existing
instruments on the "receiving end" issues of disaster relief described
in this is the non-binding 'Measures to Expedite International
Relief,"'14 2 which was adopted by resolutions of both the International
Conference of the Red Cross and the UN General Assembly in
1977.143 Measures provide specific recommendations in the area of
customs, visas for relief personnel, transport, and access to
communication facilities.
Specifically with regard to food aid,
Recommendation D calls on states to "waive-to the extent
compatible with minimum standards of hygiene[-] ... restrictions on
food imports." The Measures also called on "all donors" to avoid
sending "irrelevant goods," to provide adequate notification to

139.
See, e.g., Angola: Relief food held at ports, WFP concerned, IRINNEWS, Oct.
17, 2002, available at http://www.irinnews.org.
140.
See Elise Baudot-Qu~guiner, The Laws and Principles Governing
Preparedness, Relief and Rehabilitation Operations: the Unique Case of the
InternationalFederation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, in INTERNATIONAL
DISASTER RESPONSE LAWS, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE: REFLECTIONS, PROSPECTS AND
CHALLENGES, supra note 135, at 131-34.

141.
See Tampere Convention, supra note 127, art V. See generally Int'l Fed'n of
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Research and Publications: The Tampere
Convention, http://www.ifrc.org/what/disasters/idrlIresearch/tampere. asp (last visited
Oct. 9, 2007).
142.
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the United
Nations GeneralAssembly, Annex II, UN Doc. No. A/32/61 (May 12, 1977).
143.
See Office of the U.N. Disaster Relief Co-ordinator, G.A. Res 32/56, 32nd
Sess., 98th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. No. AIRES/32/56 (Dec. 8,1977); U.N. Econ. & Social
Council, Res. 2012 (LXIII) (Aug. 3, 1977); Measures to Expedite International Disaster
Relief, res. VI, 23rd Int'l Conference of the Red Cross, reprinted in INT'L FED'N OF THE
RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS
AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT 811-15 (3d ed. 1994).
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consignees of impending relief shipments, and to educate private
donors to avoid sending unnecessary relief items.
Unfortunately, the Measures to Expedite have mainly been
forgotten in practice. However, some of its themes can be discerned
in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1991, considered the
144
cornerstone of the current U.N. system of humanitarian relief.
That resolution includes a set of "Guiding Principles" concerning the
initiation and conduct of disaster relief operations as well as novel
coordination and institutional mechanisms to improve international
cooperation. 14 5 It also calls on states, unfortunately rather vaguely,
to "facilitate the work of [humanitarian] organizations in
implementing humanitarian assistance, in particular the supply of
food, medicines, shelter and health care, for which access to victims is
146
essential."
The international humanitarian community has also developed a
number of its own voluntary codes and standards. In 1994, the Code
of Conduct for International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
and NGOs in Disaster Relief (the "Code") was developed with the goal
of setting basic standards of behavior. 14 7 By its terms, the Code is
"not about operational details, such as how one should calculate food
rations or set up a refugee camp," but rather an attempt to
"maintain... high standards of independence, effectiveness and
14 8
impact."
In 1995, a group of NGOs took a step further down the
"operational detail" path, developing a specific NGO Code of Conduct
on Food Aid and Food Security (Food Aid Code). 149 The Food Aid
Code commits signatories to strive to fulfil the right to food, inter alia
by acting rapidly to import food (if needed) and distribute it,
implementing comprehensive programs aimed at the root causes of
food insecurity, ensuring that beneficiaries actively participate in
program planning, coordinating adequately with other stakeholders,
50
and providing high-quality, well-balanced food items.'
In 1998, an even larger stride was taken with the publication of
the first trial edition of the Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and

144.
Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance
of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 46/182, 46th Sess., 78th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. No.
A/RES/46/182 (Dec. 19,1991).
145.
Id. Annex 1.
146.
Id. 16.
147.
Int'l Fed'n of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies, The Code of Conduct for
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief,
1995, http://www.ifrc.orglDocs/idrl/1259EN.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
148.
Id. at pmbl.
149.
The text of the Food Aid Code is available on the website of Dochds (the
Irish Association of Non-Governmental
Organizations), http://www.dochas.ie
resources10a.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
150.
Id.
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Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (Sphere Handbook). 151
Now in its second final edition, the Sphere Handbook (1) provides a
grounding in human rights as well as humanitarian and refugee law
for humanitarian relief actions, and (2) sets out detailed minimal
operational standards for a number of sectors, including food security,
152
nutrition and food aid.
V. ONE WAY FORWARD

With the debate in the Doha round and the approaching
termination date for the FAC, a number of proposals have been made
for transforming and strengthening global governance of food aid.
The FAO, for example, devoted its annual "State of Food and
Agriculture" report to this issue in 2006, and persuasively called,
among other things, for the untying of food aid and a substantial
reduction in the reliance on imported, in-kind food in favor of cashbased interventions and a more comprehensive food security
approach. 153 Other analysts have made powerful arguments for
stronger monitoring and oversight of food aid, particularly in a
humanitarian forum such as the FAO or a new body, rather than in
the weak Food Aid Committee or the trade-dominated atmosphere of
the WTO. 154 Quite understandably, given the overall numbers, these
recommendations focus in substantial part on improving the food aid
provided by governments in response to the slow-onset disasters that
155
cause such massive famines.
However, as this Article has tried to point out, food aid is an
important phenomenon in sudden impact disasters as well.
Moreover, somewhat different dynamics are at play in the suddenimpact context, including the greater need for an immediate
response, the stronger case for the use of in-kind food, and
particularly, the relatively larger impact of non-governmental actors
on the food aid arena, in light of the higher "CNN-effect" and the
delays in moving governmental food aid. 156 While there is much that
is positive in this larger disaster-relief community, it also increases
the potential for poor coordination, inappropriate aid, and gridlock at
key regulatory entry points.
Existing food-aid-specific instruments do not pay attention to
these non-state actors or adequately address the role of the affected
state. If these instruments are reformed, these issues should be given

SPHERE PROJECT, supra note 22.
151.
152.
Id. at 16-19.
See Food Aid for Food Security, supra note 1, at 8-9.
153.
See, e.g., MURPHY, supra, note 28, at 33; Christopher Barrett & David
154.
Maxwell, Towards a Global Food Aid Compact, 31 FOOD POLICY 105 (2006).
Food Aid for Food Security, supra note 1, at 52-56.
155.
Martin, supra note 41, at 234.
156.
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greater consideration.
Moreover, as the sudden-impact disaster
context particularly illustrates, food aid is only part of a successful
disaster-relief and recovery operation. Yet existing instruments and
sectoral norms about international disaster relief are scattered and
disparate. Greater cohesion between these various regimes would
likely lead to more effective operations.
It is possible that law along these lines will someday be
developed at the international level. It is notable in this regard that
the International Law Commission (a U.N. body whose object is the
"promotion of the progressive development of international law and
its codification") 15 7 recently decided to place the broad issue of the
"protection of persons in natural disasters" on its program of work. 158
However, the political obstacles opposing such a path remain
significant. 159 In the meantime, promotion of legal development at
the national level in key disaster-prone states would seem to be a
viable short-term means to bring these disparate issues together and
to face up to the receiving-end issues in disaster relief.
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies is currently developing a set of "Guidelines for the domestic
facilitation and regulation of international disaster relief and initial
recovery assistance" with this idea in mind. 160 The purpose of the
guidelines is to compile the existing international norms to assist
states in developing and enhancing national laws that pertain to
receiving international disaster assistance (including both slow- and
sudden-impact disasters). 161 They would seek to address the most
common receiving-end problems in disaster relief interventions,
including food aid. They would also incorporate internationally
accepted humanitarian quality standards (such as those so powerfully
articulated but insufficiently enforced in FAC) as a measure for which
international actors should be provided legal facilities. 162
The
Guidelines would thus encourage states to prepare themselves to play
a more deliberate and principled role in the regulation of the full
range of international relief actors.
It is hoped that these Guidelines will be adopted by states and
the components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement at the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red

157.
Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174(11), art. 1(Nov.
21, 1947), available at http://www.un.orgflaw/ilc.
158.
See Int'l Law Comm., Report on the Work of its 58th Session, at 464, U.N.
Doc. A/61/10 (May 1-June 9, 2006 and July 3-Aug. 11, 2006).
159.
See David Fidler, Disaster Relief and Governance after the Indian Ocean
Tsunami: What Role for InternationalLaw?, 6 MELBOURNE J. OF INT'L L. 458 (2005).
160.
For a description of the Guidelines and their development process, see Int'l
Fed'n of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies, International Disaster Response Laws,
Rules and Principles programme (IDRL), http://www.ifrc.org/idrl.
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
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Crescent in November 2007.163 If so, they should be a helpful tool for
addressing some of the neglected issues in food aid raised in this
article.

163.
Int'l Fed'n of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies, Events and Meetings,
http://www.ifrc.org/meetings/index.asp?navid=07 (last visited Sept. 22, 2007). [Editor's
note: The Guidelines were in fact adopted at the International Conference on Friday,
Nov. 30, 2007. See Press Release, Int'l Fed'n of Red Cross & Red Crescent Socieities,
Red Cross and Red Crescent Conference rallies international community to tackle
humanitarian challenges (Nov. 30, 2007), available at http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/
News/pr07/7907.asp.]

